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Abstract 	  
This research aims to investigate the various direct and indirect impacts of 
organized violence and crime on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
as well as entrepreneurs’ responses to violent acts. A mixed-method design 
based on a quantitative content analysis of 204 news stories found in the 
international press and a multi-case study covering 10 SMEs operating in 
Monterrey, Mexico, is used to explore entrepreneurs’ responses to the direct 
and indirect effects of violent acts.	  The results highlight the dynamic between 
informal and formal institutions in SMEs’ attempts to survive in complex 
institutional contexts. 	  Future studies based on the results of this research 
could enhance the literature on SMEs and entrepreneurs in emerging markets. 
The results, which illustrate entrepreneurs’ responses to violent acts, enhance 
our understanding of the emerging operational and managerial strategies of 
SMEs operating in complex institutional contexts.	  The findings highlight the 
emerging process of social change in Mexican society among members of the 
middle class, and various attempts to fight back against organized violence 
and crime in a non-violent manner.  	  SMEs are important in Mexico and Latin 
America. However, the understanding of the direct and indirect impacts of 
organized crime and violence on SMEs is limited. This research identifies and 
analyzes the emerging responses of entrepreneurs to these institutional 
constraints.  	  
Keywords: SMEs, institutional theory, violence and crime, Mexico	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1. Introduction	  
For small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), Latin America’s 
institutional context presents not only numerous opportunities but also 
significant challenges. The region is undergoing a process of institutional 
change (e.g., Diaz and Vassolo, 2012). At the same time, organized crime and 
violence have become one of the most difficult challenges (Latinobarómetro, 
2013) faced by entrepreneurs and owners of SMEs in Latin America. 
Entrepreneurs who develop new products, services and techniques are 
confronted by criminal entrepreneurship (Smith, 2009), who execute 
organized crime and violence acts (Sutter, Webb, Kistruck, and Bailey, 2013) 
as they modus essendi, modus operndi and modus vivendi (Smith, 2009, p. 
257). This paper analyze non-criminal entrepreneurs in Mexico, who cannot 
rely on secure property rights enshrined in the rule of law, and usually lack 
bargaining power (Parker, 2009, p. 20) against powerful drug cartels and the 
public bureaucratic system (Estrin and Prevezer, 2011).	  
Mexico encompasses a critical paradox crime-entrepreneur (van Duyne, 
1999), such as lords of drug cartels that have destabilized the Mexican 
institutional context. At the same time, Mexico’s political and economic 
transformation since the 1980s (e.g., Carrillo Rivera, 2007) has set the stage 
for a relatively stable economy (OECD, 2013), which is highlighted by the 
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27% increase in entrepreneurship activities between 2005 and 2008 (Ernst 
and Young, 2013). This paradox suggests that national and international firms 
can prosper in Mexico despite the country’s fragile institutional context. 	  
In this paper, we present a sequential, explanatory, mixed-method study 
(Creswell, 2009) with the aim of providing an account of the direct and 
indirect impacts of organized crime and violence on SMEs in Monterrey, 
Mexico. Our study is based on a quantitative content analysis of international 
news reports to	   explore how the press presents entrepreneurs’ owners of 
SMEs actions in response to violence. We also use a multiple case study (Yin, 
1989) to map entrepreneurs’ responses (Oliver, 1991) to organized violence 
and crime in Monterrey. 	  
This research is based in Monterrey, which is located in the state of 
Nuevo León that shares a border with the US state of Texas. The city was 
selected for our research as it is considered to be the industrial capital of 
Mexico and as it makes a significant contribution to Mexico’s economy 
(World Bank, 2012). At the same time, Monterrey is one of the Mexican 
cities that is most affected by an increasing number of violent and criminal 
activities (INEGI, 2013). The Mexican experience therefore serves as an 
appropriate context for discussions of how the local institutional structure 
(Scott, 2013) challenges the development of SMEs in Latin America, where 
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SMEs comprise 99% of businesses, employ approximately 67% of the 
region’s workforce, and play a key role in enhancing potential growth (OECD 
and ECLAC, 2013).     	  
First, we discuss extant theory regarding organizational responses to the 
institutional context (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2013). We then develop our 
methodology before we present our results. Our findings enable us to draw 
implications for politicians, entrepreneurs, and academics, which are 
presented in the concluding remarks. 	  
2. Relevant literature	  
Institutional conditions	  
Complex institutional contexts in which inefficient formal institutions 
(North, 1990) are characterized by corruption (e.g., Vassolo, De Castro, and 
Gomez-Mejia, 2011) and clientelism ‘patronage arrangements’ (Fox, 1994) 
have been found to affect the development of SMEs (e.g., Sutter et al., 2013). 
At the same time, SMEs’ survival may be challenged by informal institutions 
(Helmke and Levitsky, 2006; North, 1990) characterized by low levels of 
trust among members of the society owing to the operation of drug cartels in 
society (UNODC, 2013). Complex institutional contexts, which are plagued 
by organized crime and violence, might have direct and/or indirect negative 
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impacts on firms (Bader and Berg, 2013). 	  
Arguably, members of civil society might construct their interpretations 
of organized crime and violence, and their resulting actions based on the 
journalists’ framing of the situation. For example, Neuman and colleagues 
argue that frames used in news stories are “conceptual tools which media and 
individuals rely on to convey, interpret and evaluate information” (1992, p. 
60). This argument will be elaborated in the context of Monterrey, Mexico 
which is present in the following section.  	  
The institutional context in Monterrey	  
Several Latin American multinationals (“multilatinas”) have emerged in 
Monterrey, including the world’s third-largest cement maker, Cemex, the 
largest public bottle of Coca-Cola products in the world in terms of sale and 
volume, Femsa, the worlds’ largest manufacturer of corn flour and tortillas, 
Gruma, among others. These multinationals have flourished in Monterrey 
despite the spread of the drug cartels and organized crime in the recent years.	  
While Felipe Calderón Hinojosa was President of Mexico, the 
administration decided to directly confront drug-trafficking organizations. It 
is argued that as a result of it, from January through October 2010, 530 deaths 
related to cartel crimes were reported, which represented an increase of 
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1,081% in from 2009 (Durin, 2012). The administration’s war against the 
cartels quickly turned into an inter-cartel competition, and led to a string of 
disturbing and violent incidents, ranging from robbery to murder, perpetrated 
by different organized criminals and street crime-entrepreneurs (INEGI, 
2013). 	  
According to INEGI (2013), 182,122 cases of extortion were reported in 
Nuevo León in 2012. Such extortion took the form of cuotas por uso de piso. 
It could be argued that entrepreneurs who are challenged by crime-
entrepreneurs might consciously or unconsciously devise different strategies 
to respond to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991), which might be 
influenced by mass media reports. Several such strategies are presented in the 
following section. 	  
Responses to institutional pressures	  
Oliver (1991) proposes a model that encompasses several strategic 
responses to institutional pressures: acquiescence, avoidance, defiance, and 
manipulation. “Acquiescence” refers to acceding to institutional pressures 
(Oliver, 1991), such as complying with illegitimate demands. Acquiescence 
can take several tactics: 1) habit, which refers to unconscious or blind 
adherence to preconscious or taken-for-granted value rules (Oliver, 1991); 2) 
imitation or voluntary, conscious avoidance; or 3) compliance. In this 
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research, we refer to extortion or cuotas por uso de piso, which are the 
illegitimate financial demands that members of organized crime impose upon 
entrepreneurs.	  
“Avoidance” is an organizational attempt to preclude the necessity of 
conforming by taking the following tactics: 1) concealing, 2) buffering, or 3) 
escaping from institutional pressures. Concealment is nonconformity hidden 
behind a façade of acquiescence that is purely symbolic (Pache and Santos, 
2010, p. 462). Buffering refers to an organization’s attempt to reduce the 
extent to which it is externally scrutinized by partially detaching or 
decoupling its technical activities from external contacts (Oliver, 1991, p. 
155), perhaps by restricting the distribution of information (Hirschman, 
1970). Escape refers to an organization’s exit from the domain in which 
pressure was exerted (Hirschman, 1970), or to significant alterations in the 
organization’s own goals, activities, or domains to avoid the necessity of 
conformity (Oliver, 1991, p. 155). 	  
“Defiance” is a more active form of resistance to institutional pressure 
(Oliver, 1991) that includes: 1) dismissal, 2) challenge, and 3) attack tactics. 
Dismissal, which entails ignoring institutional rules and values, is a strategic 
option that entrepreneurs are more likely to exercise when the potential for 
external enforcement of institutional rules is perceived as low. Challenge 
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refers to contesting the imposed norms, while attack refers to an 
organization’s intense and aggressive departure from institutional pressures 
and expectations (Oliver, 1991).	  
“Manipulation” refers to the active intent to change or exert power over 
institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991) through: 1) co-optation, 2) influence, or 
3) control tactics. A co-optation tactic seeks to neutralize institutional 
opposition and enhance legitimacy. Influence and control are tactics that 
specifically seek to establish power and dominance over the external 
constituents that are applying pressure on the organization (Oliver, 1991). 
This tactic is related to Hirschman’s (1970, p. 30) notion of voice as “any 
attempt at all to change, rather than to escape,” which has also been referred 
as to alteration (Henrekson and Sanandaji, 2011). In Oliver’s (1991) 
repertoire, from a passive role, the institutional context is taken as one in 
which entrepreneurs cannot make an impact: it is the way the society 
functions. However, some individuals might take a more proactive role with 
the goal of changing the institutional context. 	  
This discussion leads us to the following research questions:	  
RQ1: Which criminal and violent acts towards SMEs, are reported in the 
international press?	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RQ2: How do entrepreneurs respond to criminal and violent acts in 
Monterrey, Mexico?  	  
 3. Research Design / Methods	  
Our study is based on a sequential, explanatory, mixed-method design 
(Creswell, 2009) that was developed in two stages. 	  
First stage: quantitative content analysis	  
In order to explore crime and violence acts, as reported in the 
international press, we developed a quantitative content analysis. We 
performed a search of the FACTIVA database for articles that contained the 
following keywords: “SMEs,” “entrepreneurs,” “crime,” “violence,” 
“Mexico,” “cartels,” and “extortion.” The search covered articles published 
between December 1, 2006, and November 30, 2012. This period corresponds 
to the presidency of Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, the Mexican president that 
implemented the “war against cartels” strategy. As the FACTIVA database 
does not include Mexican news outlets, we also undertook a manual search of 
news available on the websites of the most influential Mexican newspapers in 
terms of readership: La Jornada, Milenio, El Porvenir, CNNMéxico, La 
Prensa, and Proceso. The outcome was a total of 4,436 Mexican and 
international news reports.	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We imported the 4,436 electronic documents into the NVivo10 qualitative 
software package. We analyzed the data set to identify articles that covered 
the main research topic: organized crime, and violence towards entrepreneurs 
and or SMEs. We searched for the keywords individually and in combination 
in order to develop an understanding of organized violence and crime, and 
entrepreneurs’ responses. This procedure narrowed the number of documents 
to 2,446. Of these stories, 673 mentioned at least one incident of violence. Of 
those 673 articles, 204 presented at least one response from an entrepreneur. 
We used these 204 articles as the main data set. These articles included media 
reports that discussed actual violence and acts of crime (INEGI, 2013), media 
reports that mentioned at least one entrepreneur’s response to violence in 
Mexico, and media reports that integrated statements made by entrepreneurs 
illustrating their responses to violence. Of the 204 newspaper articles, 105 
(51.5%) originated from the US, 53 originated from Mexico (26%), 29 
originated from Spain (14.2%), 7 originated from the United Kingdom 
(3.4%), 6 originated from France (2.9%), 3 originated from Canada (1.5%), 
and 1 originated from New Zealand (.5%). The average length of the sample 
stories was 701.28 words (SD = 1,144.80), while article length ranged from 
248 to 10,390 words.	  
Then we hired two bilingual (Spanish-English) Ph.D. students in 
communication to independently code the 204 newspaper articles using a 
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codebook. Although the coders were trained to use the codebook, neither the 
research questions nor the purpose of the research were revealed. The 
codebook was constructed by strategies responses to institutional pressures 
were built from Oliver’s (1991) above presented. Data on violence and acts of 
crime were taken from the Mexican national survey of victimization and 
perceptions of public safety (INEGI, 2013). 	  
The documents were read in full to ensure a detailed and systematic 
analysis to uncover paragraphs that could be used to frame and assess the 
entrepreneurs’ responses to organized crime and violence. Inter-coder 
reliability—the Cohen’s kappa coefficient (Brennan and Prediger, 1981)—for 
a random subsample of 50 media reports was between .81 and 1 for all 
variables. The lowest kappa coefficients were found for the attack tactic (.81) 
and for escape within the current city (.9). For the rest of the variables, 
agreement between the two independent coders was at 1.	  
 
Second stage: qualitative analysis 	  
Based on the results of the quantitative content analysis, we constructed 
an interview protocol that would enable us to conduct a series of semi-
structured interviews for the purpose of building a multi-case study. Four 
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main questions were included in the protocol: 1) How have organized crime 
and violence affected your own life? 2) How have organized crime and 
violence affected employees’ efficiency at work? 3) How have organized 
crime and violence have affected the firm’s work environment?, and 4) What 
are the main strategies your firm has designed and implemented to respond to 
organized violence and crime?	  
We systematically compared (Miles and Huberman, 1994) the transcripts 
of the interviews, our research notes, and the results of the quantitative 
content analysis in the context of organized crime and violence in Monterrey. 
We coded the direct and indirect impacts of crime and violence on SMEs and 
work-related practices as mentioned in each interview in relation to the 
context of each firm (e.g., industrial sector, location, market, and size in terms 
of the number of employees). 	  
4. Results	  
In this section presents the results of the quantitative content analysis, 
which allow us to discuss the findings from our multi-case analysis.  	  
Quantitative statistical analysis	  
Our research questions center on the violent and criminal acts towards 
SMEs and entrepreneurs’ responses. First, we conducted a principal 
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component analysis with varimax rotation to group 13 different types of 
violent and criminal acts, covered in the news: 1) kidnapping, 2) injury from 
physical aggression, 3) murder, 4) robbery or assault (on the street or on 
public transport), 5) face-to-face threats 6) face-to-face extortion at SMEs, 7) 
total or partial theft of SMEs’ materials, 8) e-mail threats, 9) phone threats, 
10) fraud or bank-card cloning, 11) social-media threats, 12) destruction of 
SMEs’ property, and 13) theft or assault at SMEs. The analysis resulted in 
two orthogonal factors (eigenvalues > 1) that explain 60% of the total 
variance, see table 1.  
______________________	  
Insert Table 1 about here	  
_______________________	  
Factor 1: The violent and criminal acts that comprise this factor are: 1) 
face-to-face extortion at SMEs, 2) total or partial theft of SMEs’ materials, 3) 
theft or assault at SMEs, and 4)	  destruction of SMEs’ property. This factor 
was named “direct impacts” (= .769).	  
Factor 2: The violent and criminal acts that comprise this factor are: 1) 
robbery or assault (on the street or on public transport), 2) injury due to 
physical aggression, 3) kidnapping, and 4) murder. This factor was termed 
“indirect impacts” (= .747).	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Second, in order to investigate the underlying strategic responses to 
institutional pressures, we developed a separate principal component analysis 
with a varimax rotation covering the 12 different response tactics. The 12 
tactics clustered into three orthogonal factors (eigenvalues > 1) that explain 
53% of the total variance: acquiesce (= .817), avoid (= .688), and manipulate 
(= .831). The tactics conceal and buffer (avoid strategies), and dismiss, 
challenge, and attack (defy strategies) were not included in the analysis, as 
they did not meet the threshold (item loadings at more than .50). The avoid 
factor is composed of three forms of escape that emerged from the 
quantitative content analysis: 1) close the SME, 2) escape to another Mexican 
state, and 3) escape to the US. The acquiesce and manipulate factors clustered 
as suggested in the theoretical discussion, see table 2. 
______________________	  
Insert Table 2 about here	  
_______________________	  
We also explore the relations among the factors emerging from the 
quantitative content analysis. For this purpose, we conducted a correlation 
analysis between the direct/indirect impacts of violence and criminal acts, and 
the acquiesce, avoid, and manipulate strategies, see table 3. 
______________________	  
Insert Table 3 about here	  
_______________________	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The positive correlations found between the acquiesce strategy and 1) 
indirect impacts (0.161* <0.05) and 2) direct impacts (0.426** <0.01) might 
suggest that entrepreneurs interpret the institutional arrangements found in 
Monterrey as the way that business operates. For example, entrepreneurs tend 
to quickly bend to crime-entrepreneurs’ illegal demands for payment. 
Consider, for example, the following statement:	  
“Restaurants, bars, delicatessens, shoe shops, everyone is paying 
extortion money, said a businessman with a car dealership who has been 
extorted by drug gangs and declined to be named. And if you can’t pay 
both extortion fees and your taxes, you tell the gangs and they sort it out 
for you” (Emmott, 2011).	  
The results of the principal component analysis also suggest a positive 
correlation between avoid strategies and the direct impacts factor (0.202** < 
0.01). Given the lack of trust in formal institutions and given the various the 
governance indicators, entrepreneurs seem to be forced to escape to another 
city in Mexico or to the US (IDMC, 2012). Alternatively, entrepreneurs might 
choose to close their businesses. 	  
It is important to analyze the profiles of entrepreneurs who move away 
from Monterrey. Entrepreneurs seem to make a strategic choice within the 
emerging strategy based on their resources. One group of entrepreneurs lacks 
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the ability to relocate internationally and refuses to pay the illegal payments 
demanded by the crime-entrepreneurs. Thus, these entrepreneurs either move 
to another city in Mexico or simply close their businesses.	  
A second group encompasses distressed entrepreneurs, or “refugees 
across borders.” These entrepreneurs have the financial resources and 
networks necessary to obtain a US EB-5 fast-track investor visa for 
themselves and their families. Consider, for example, the following 
statement:	  
“Jesus Gomez owns a Monterrey factory with 250 workers … he bought a 
house in a quiet neighborhood in McAllen [Texas] after receiving five 
threatening phone calls from people he described as ‘vigilantes’ looking 
for money” (Whelan, 2012). 	  
Entrepreneurs who immigrate to the US might implement a new 
organizational form (e.g., Baumol, 1990). This is particularly true with regard 
to managerial systems, and can include the introduction of changes in the 
firm’s organizational structure and in administrative processes.	  
We interpret the configuration of the manipulate strategy, which is 
positively correlated with the direct impacts factor (0.250** <0.01), as 
representing entrepreneurs’ involvement to challenge organized crime and 
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violence, as a lack of trust of formal institutions prevails. The quantitative 
content analysis suggests that entrepreneurs challenge organized crime and 
violence by relying on their own investments, most of which focus on private 
security or infrastructure, as illustrated by the following excerpt:	  
“Given the increasing violence in Monterrey, the owners of bars, clubs 
and restaurants are not only concerned about meeting the culinary and 
needs of their customers, but also with providing both customers and 
employees greater security; thus, more than the 50% of the restaurants in 
Monterrey operate with CCTV [closed-circuit television]” (Estrada, 
2011).	  
This correlation might also indicate that some levels of civil society 
become actively involved in the “war against crime.” They seem to confront 
institutional challenges by pressuring governmental officials. The following is 
a typical example:	  
 “I think the urgency of all this is very clear in the city's leaders—in the 
civic leaders, in the government leaders. It's very clear. That's why you 
will see the response of a well-organized civil society responding to this 
threat, through the institutions” (Luhnow, 2010).	  
Notably, the selection of the co-optation tactic, in which the firm seeks to 
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neutralize institutional opposition and enhance legitimacy, has been also 
reported in various Latin American countries. For example, the Colombian 
firm Hocol (Andonova, Gutierrez, and Avella, 2009) has developed several 
social programs through which the firm works with local communities and 
governmental officials with the aim of creating legitimacy, which in turn 
gives the firm a “license to operate” in areas of conflict in Colombia. 	  
The manipulate strategy might be a contradiction in Mexico, where there 
are problems with the rule of law (World Bank, 2012). However, influence 
and co-opt tactics are related to Hirschman’s (1970, p. 30) notion of voice, 
which refers to “any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape.” 	  
Our results appear to suggest the presence of contradictions among the 
manipulate, acquiesce, and avoid strategies. We interpret these apparent 
contradictions as a result of the heterogeneity evident in Monterrey. For 
example, levels of organized crime and violence seem to vary within the 
Monterrey metropolitan area. Furthermore, entrepreneurs and civil society 
appear to select different strategies for responding to institutional pressures 
based on their resources. As discussed above, some entrepreneurs might 
invest more in security in order to attract customers, as described in this 
statement:	  
“In wealthier parts of the area [Monterrey], restaurants are still packed 
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and people still jog and walk their dogs at night. In poorer suburbs, 
though, entire blocks have been held up by gunmen and young people 
snatched off the streets” (Rodriguez, 2011).	  
Alternatively, firms might decide to simply comply with crime-
entrepreneurs’ demands or to escape from Monterrey to the US. These 
different approaches illustrate the various realities found in Monterrey, 
especially in terms of social cohesion (World Bank, 2013).	  
The quantitative content analysis does not offer evidence of entrepreneurs 
adopting a defy strategy (directly fighting back) in the face of organized 
crime. This strategy has been found in Guatemala (Sutter et al., 2013). Crime-
entrepreneurs operating in Monterrey seem to have powerful resources that 
encourage entrepreneurs to avoid direct confrontation. 	  
Qualitative analysis – multi-case study	  
In order to further investigate our second research question, we developed 
a multi-case study. However, giving the intricate nature of our research, we 
relied on our personal network to contact managers and owners of SMEs 
when building our multi-case study. We gained access to 10 Mexican-owned 
SMEs. One of the authors conducted interviews with representatives of 
management of these SMEs. All interviews took place between September 3 
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and September 27, 2013, and sixteen senior managers and one firm owner 
were interviewed. The interviews lasted approximately 45 minutes, and all 
interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Given the 
confidentiality agreements signed with the owners of the SMEs in this article, 
we do not include a detailed account of each case. Instead, we present our 
multi-case study as a combined account of the struggles highlighted in our 
cases. The focus is on the impacts of organized crime and violence on SMEs.	  
Seven of the 10 SMEs included in our analysis had manufacturing plants 
in Monterrey. Two of the 10 firms were service providers with offices located 
in the Guadalupe municipality, which lies within the Monterrey metropolitan 
area. The remaining firm was a manufacturing firm located in the 
municipality of Cienegas de Flores, which is 50 kilometers from Monterrey. 
The SMEs’ sizes, in terms of number employees, ranged from 30 to 500. The 
SMEs were established between 1906 and 2007.	  
We found several patterns between the media’s accounts of the direct and 
indirect impacts of crime and violent acts, and the accounts given during the 
interviews. These allowed us to identify two main domains of SMEs’ 
responses in our cases: organizational process (OP) and managerial (MGA). 	  
The organizational-process (OP) domain covers the work-environment 
policies introduced by firms to protect their employees at work as well as the 
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SMEs’ infrastructure. Of the SMEs in our sample, 88% had invested in 
security. In this regard, one HR manager commented:	  
“Some of our delivery vehicles had been attacked. Therefore, we needed 
to implement a security policy. Our transportation fleet is now equipped 
with global-positioning systems”.  	  
The informants suggested that the lack of trust seemed to be escalating at 
both the governmental and civil society levels. As a result, 56% of the SMEs 
had implemented specific organizational policies. For instance, many firms 
blocked incoming calls from unknown numbers and stopped deliveries and/or 
ceased provision of the SMEs’ products or services in conflict-affected areas. 
Our main findings in the OP domain are presented in Table 4.  	  
______________________	  
Insert Table 4 about here	  
_______________________	  
We identified a number of consequences arising from the indirect impacts 
of violence and criminal acts from the quantitative content analysis. These 
seem to have direct impacts on MGA domain, which we refer to as the 
managerial and work-related practices implemented to support employees 
working in complex institutional settings. For example, kidnapping and 
murder are some of the issues that seem to have a negative effect on 
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employees’ stress levels (57% of SMEs in our sample), while they also result 
in lower productivity (32%) and a lack of concentration (19%). In addition, 
57% of the respondents agreed that the level of motivation among employees 
had worsened in 2013, while 67% stated that the quality of work had 
deteriorated that same year. Employee tardiness and/or absenteeism was a 
problem for the 44% of the SMEs. The manager of case one described the 
effect in this way:	  
“There have been several shootings just outside the plant. On those 
occasions, we need to stop the production line. Now employees are afraid 
to come to work. As a result, we have higher levels of absenteeism”. 	  
One action implemented in the MGA domain is a flexible management 
style, which implies the acceptance of tardiness or absenteeism in the event of 
street shootings. As highlighted by one HR manager, “some employees use 
the organized crime and violence factor as a reason for not showing up to 
work”. 	  
On the other hand, one recurrent pattern evident in the multi-case study 
was that managers typically encouraged employees to participate in 
brainstorming sessions to develop security policies and practices, and to 
endorse the organizational values and ethics. A summary of the ways in 
which the management style was reconfigured is presented in Table 5.	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______________________	  
Insert Table 5 about here	  
_______________________	  
	  
5. Discussion and conclusions	  
In this paper, we aimed to explore the various direct and indirect impacts 
of organized crime and violence acts on SMEs, and entrepreneurs’ responses. 
The study can be summarized in two points: 1) various elements of a nation’s 
institutional context seem to be important in determining entrepreneurs’ 
responses, and 2) the implementation of operational and managerial practices 
at SMEs, such as investments in security and surveillance systems, and the 
introduction of supportive managerial practices, seem to be essential for the 
10 firms studied here, all of which are operating in locations plagued by 
crime and violence. The academic literature offers limited empirical research 
covering these two points. Therefore, our findings suggest that we need to 
rethink the configuration of SME management practices that are designed 
elsewhere and then introduced in Mexico or in other emerging economies.	  
The results presented here have several theoretical and managerial 
implications. In terms of complex institutional contexts, our analysis of the 
news reports and the themes emerging from our multi-case study highlight 
potential inefficiencies of formal institutions. This is particularly true with 
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regard to the characteristics of the rule of law in Mexico, which shapes 
entrepreneurs’ expectations (North, 1990) and encourages them to 
strategically develop alternative adaptation processes in response to 
inefficiencies and the lack of trust in formal institutions. The use of the 
manipulation strategy seems to lead to the creation of formal rules and can 
shape formal institutional outcomes in a less visible (Brinks, 2003) way by 
creating or strengthening incentives to comply with formal rules. 	  
One important point is that our results might suggests the social-change 
process that is emerging in Mexican society. This transition process is also 
evident, for example in Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. It affects members 
of the middle class, who are generally the entrepreneurs in Mexico and across 
Latin America (Naranjo and Campos, 2011). These actors are involved in a 
profound attempt to fight back against crime-entrepreneurs, in a non-violent 
manner by collaborating within civil society and/or with local governments. 
However, only future research could test this tentative outcome from this 
research.	  
In terms of practical implications, special attention should be paid to 
entrepreneurs’ abilities to adapt to institutional constraints. Adaptation seems 
to be an important factor in SMEs’ survival, especially as SMEs might not 
have governmental protection or the capital necessary to combat crime-
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entrepreneurs. The strategies evident in the quantitative content analysis – the 
acquiesce, avoid, and manipulation strategies – for responding to criminal 
and violent acts, reflect to those discussed in other studies (e.g., Sutter et al., 
2013; Estrin and Prevezer, 2011). However, we suggest that informal 
institutions and organized crime and violence in Mexico have an impact not 
only in terms of strategic responses but also in terms of formal institutions. 
We therefore urge researchers focused on emerging and transition economies 
to consider how entrepreneurs respond to challenges found in complex 
institutional settings and how those responses shape formal institutions. This 
might help in the development of novel SME strategies that can 
simultaneously meet customers’ demands and institutional challenges.  	  
In conclusion, the institutional context of Monterrey highlights the 
challenges SMEs face in attempting to deal with organized crime, which 
appear to be a phenomenon also found in other transition economies, such as 
those in Eastern Europe, Guatemala and Russia (Estrin and Prevezer, 2011; 
Sutter et al., 2013).	  It therefore provides fertile ground for the development of 
new elements in studies of SMEs. Additional research in emerging economies 
might help us to better understand how entrepreneurs respond and design 
strategies in complex institutional settings.	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Tables: 
 
Table 1: Varimax-Rotated Factor Solution for Direct and Indirect Impacts 
 
Illegitimated arrangements items 
 
Factors 
Factor 1 
Direct Impact 
(α=.769) 
Factor 2 
Indirect Impact 
(α=.747) 
Face to face extortion at the SME ,586 ,443 
Total or partial theft of SMEs’ 
materials or equipment 
,697 ,290 
Theft or assault at the SME ,831 ,127 
Destruction of firms’ infrastructure ,821 ,067 
Robbery or assault in the street or 
on public transport 
,396 ,640 
Injury due to physical aggression ,273 ,706 
Kidnapping ,177 ,763 
Murder ,000 ,753 
	  
Table 2: Varimax-Rotated Factor Solution for the Tactics items 
Tactics 
Factors 
Factor 1 
Avoid (α=.688) 
Factor 2 
Manipulate (α=.831) 
Factor 3 
Acquiesce (α=.817) 
Habit -,012 ,141 ,811 
Imitate ,106 ,008 ,911 
Comply ,149 -,003 ,833 
Escape-CD ,694 ,141 ,252 
Escape-MTY ,774 -,151 ,051 
Escape-MX ,723 ,079 ,085 
Escape-Ext. ,828 -,139 -,083 
Co-opt ,068 ,879 ,100 
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Influence -,054 ,819 ,056 
Control -,071 ,878 -,005 
	  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlations 
 Direct 
Impacts 
Indirect 
Impacts 
Avoid Manipulate Acquiesce 
Direct Impacts 1     
Indirect 
Impacts 
,000 1    
Avoid ,202** -,073 1   
Manipulate ,250** ,047 ,000 1  
Acquiesce ,426** ,161* ,000 ,000 1 
**. Pearson Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Pearson Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
	  
Table 4: Organizational process (OP) domains 
Organizational 
process (OP) 
domains 
Percentage of 
informants 
mentioning 
OP domains 
Examples of impacts of the 
institutional context on OP domains 
Investment and actions 
Investments in 
security 88 
• Investment in a global positioning 
system (GPS) system for the 
company’s transportation fleet  
• Installation of video-surveillance 
systems  
• Private transportation for employees 
• Introduction of private security 
guards  
Change in 
organizational 
policies and 
processes 
56 
• Changes in logistics for delivery of 
products and services 
• Phone calls from unknown numbers 
blocked 
• Firm’s front door locked 
• Identification necessary to enter the 
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firm  
• No firm logo (e.g., on firm’s fleet) 
• Allow work at home    
• Change working hours 
• Cancel night shift 
 
Table 5: Managerial (MGA) domains 
Managerial 
domains 
Percentage of 
informants 
mentioning 
MGA 
domains 
Examples of impacts of the 
institutional context on MGA domains 
Re-configuration of management style 
Stress 57 • Flexible management style 
• Emphasize work values and ethics 
• Highlight firm’s core values 
• Encourage motivation and loyalty 
among employees  
• Encourage employee involvement 
and participation in brainstorming 
sessions to develop security 
policies and practices   
Tardiness or 
absenteeism 44 
Lower 
productivity 32 
Lack of 
concentration 19 
 
	  
